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THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE FORMATION OF UKRAINIAN
IDENTITY IN GALICIA?
Jan Ladzinski

Jan Ladzinski is a Polish second-year M. R. in East European Studies at the University College
London. He graduated from the London School of Economics with a BA in History. He is
interested in interactions between various identities of the borderlands.

It could be argued that the Ukrainian identity proved to be dominant in Eastern Galicia,
when West Ukrainian People's Republic was proclaimed in November 1918 and agreed to unite
with the rest of Ukraine the following month. However, the Ukrainian identity, understood as a
national identity laying claim to statehood and encompassing a linguistic community stretching
from Carpathians to the Caucasus, was not widely accepted in Galicia until the first decade of the
twentieth century and even then it coexisted with alternative Russophile and Old Ruthenian
identities.1 David Little suggested that religious belief interacts with nationalism in a number of
complex ways2 with no clear causal relationship between the two3 but with religious beliefs leaving
“their own peculiar stamp on the form and shape of nationalism.”4 Similarly, Fox emphasized the
importance of religion in its own right and as a factor separate from other cultural features in the
context of minority discrimination.5 Thus it seems that an examination of religion as a separate
factor in the rise of Ukrainian identity in Galicia is entirely justified. Galician Ruthenians make a
particularly interesting case, as they belonged to the Greek-Catholic or Uniate Church, which set
them apart not only from the Catholic Poles but also the Ukrainian Orthodox population in the
Russian Empire. The essay attempts to analyze the role of religious belief in the formation of
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Paul Robert Magocsi, The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism: Galicia as Ukraine's Piedmont (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2002), 100.
David Little, “Belief, Ethnicity and Nationalism,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 1:2 (1995), 292.
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Ukrainian identity with reference to three functions of religion in Galician identity formation. First,
the essay examines the exclusionary role of religion. Religious difference could foster Ukrainian
identity by setting the Uniate population apart from the Catholic Poles but it could also provide an
obstacle to a shared identity with Orthodox Ukrainians. Secondly, the inclusionary role of religion is
discussed to show how certain aspects of religious practice could build bridges between Orthodox
and Uniate Ukrainians, while other encouraged communality with Poles. Finally, the essay analyses
the role of religion in creating both the national culture and language among the Ukrainians of
Galicia, and in fostering cultures that distanced themselves from the Ukrainian national program.
If we accept that nationalism often depends on exclusion and demarcation of the “other”
group, as suggested by Anthony W. Marx,6 then religion could be seen as a powerful source of such
“demarcation” in Galicia. Initially, confessional lines did not always clearly divide Galicia's
population into “national” groups, as conversions were common7 and religion remained more
important as a marker of group identity than language until mid-nineteenth century.8 In the second
half of the nineteenth century religious difference increasingly provided means to demarcate
national-linguistic boundaries. The Greek-Catholic communities used the symbol of the threebarred cross, which was erected in many villages in 1880s, despite official repressions, as a mark of
“national-religious self-differentiation” from the Poles and Polish-dominated institutions of
Galicia.9 This demarcation could be seen as a manifestation of new consciousness and organization
of peasantry, that, according to Magocsi, began in 1870s following abolition of serfdom and
increase in levels of education and literacy in previous decades.10 Furthermore, Polish publicists
emphasized religious factors in explaining the Ukrainian movement since its appearance in 1848.11

6 Anthony W. Marx, Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003),
21.
7 Ostap Sereda, “From Church-Based to Cultural Nationalism: Early Ukrainophiles, Ritual Purification Movement
and Emerging Cult of Taras Shevchenko in Austrian Eastern Galicia in the 1860s,” Canadian-American Slavic
Studies 40:1 (2006): 23-24.
8 Ibid., 24-25
9 John-Paul Himka, Religion and Nationality in Western Ukraine (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 1999), 122.
10 Magocsi, The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism, 16.
11 John-Paul Himka, “The Construction of Nationality in Galician Rus': Icarian Flights in Almost All Directions,” in
Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Michael D. Kennedy (Ann Arbor:
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Thus, the dominant Polish culture was partially responsible for both politicizing and nationalizing
the difference in rite. However religion alone, especially in the context of formal subordination of
the Uniate Church to Rome and to the Catholic Habsburg Empire, could provide grounds for
confrontation and assertion of both national and religious independence. The attempts by the
Vatican to promote the idea of celibacy among Greek-Catholic clergy at Lviv Provincial Synod of
1891 met with strong resistance based on both the Church tradition and doctrine, 12 and on the fact
that it would undermine the Ruthenian intelligentsia and thus harm the nation.13 One speaker
against official promotion of celibacy, used the term “Ruthenian Catholic Church” 14 arguing that
married clergy led the national movement and educated Ruthenians were largely sons of priest.
Thus, the national character of Greek-Catholic Church in Galicia was strongly emphasized within
the Church by the end of the century. Religious difference allowed not only for a symbolic
demarcation in Galicia but also for real struggle against Catholic impositions in matters of faith
which was also being increasingly perceived in national terms. The Greek-Catholic faith thus set
both Ruthenian villagers and clerical intelligentsia apart from Poles and Habsburg administration
which could eventually enable a stronger group identity, including the Ukrainian national identity.
Yet, just as Greek-Orthodox rite separated Ruthenians from the Catholic Poles, so could it
raise walls between them and Orthodox Ruthenians in the Russian Empire, thus becoming an
obstacle to a wider Ukrainian identity. In fact, in 1768 during the so-called Koliivschyna rebellious
Orthodox Ruthenians murdered thousands of Uniates in lands East of Galicia, despite shared
language and economic status.15 The Uniate-Orthodox tensions were not only at the source of
hostilities but remained significant throughout disturbances.16 Considering such dramatic signs of
division among Ruthenians on the basis of religion present in the eighteenth century, it is perhaps
surprising that religious difference had little impact on unity between Uniate Galicians and
University of Michigan Press, 1999), 115.
Himka,, Religion and Nationality, 108.
Ibid., 109.
Ibid.
Barbara Skinner, “Borderlands of Faith: Reconsidering the Origins of a Ukrainian Tragedy,” Slavic Review 64:1
(2005): 89.
16 Ibid., 113.
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Orthodox Ruthenians in the Russian Empire in the 1800s. This is not to say that there was no
conflict between Galicians and other Ruthenians, for example in 1890s the debate around
standardization of language divided Galicians and Dnieper Ukrainians,17 but those conflicts were
rarely based on religious difference. When Uniate inhabitants of Chełm in tsarist Russia were
forcefully converted to Orthodoxy with active help of Russophile Greek-Orthodox clergy from
Galicia in 1875, only the Church hierarchy protested seeing it as a threat.18 Ukrainian press and
political organizations were seemingly willing to accept conversions to Orthodoxy as such, and
merely opposed the means by which conversions were brought about by the Russian government.19
Thus, by the late nineteenth century the significance of religious difference between Uniate and
Orthodox Ruthenians was not emphasized, while the separateness from the Catholic Church was
maintained by Uniate opposition to Catholic influence. As the following paragraphs demonstrate,
such conditions actually allowed for a sense of unity with Orthodox Ruthenians to be expressed in
the religious sphere within and outside of Uniate Church in Galicia. On the other hand, the formal
unity between Catholics and Uniates simultaneously undermined the strict demarcation of Catholic
Poles and Uniate Ruthenians as completely separate groups.
If one follows Anderson's argument that national consciousness depends on shared field of
communication that enables individuals to imagine themselves as members of a national
community,20 cultural and literary exchange between Galicia and tsarist Ukraine was indispensable
for inclusion of two populations separated by borders into one shared culture, language and national
identity. However as late as 1890, almost 65 per cent of Galicia's population was illiterate, with
illiteracy concentrating in Ukrainian-speaking lands.21 If the idea of cultural unity of all Ukrainians
was to become popular, it had to be communicated through a more accessible medium of religion
and intermediated by the clergy. The Greek-Catholic clergy played this role, although sometimes
17
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Magocsi, The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism, 97.
Himka, Religion and Nationality, 62-63.
Ibid., 63-64.
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso,
1991), 44.
21 John-Paul Himka, Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century
(Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1988), 60.
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unwillingly. One example of practice in religious context which was meant to create a sense of
connection to population of tsarist Ukraine among Galicia's masses was the issue of
commemoration, or perhaps cult, of the national poet Taras Sevchenko. In 1862 a celebration of
requiem mass in honor of Orthodox Shevchenko in an Orthodox church in Lviv provoked a scandal,
as it turned into a patriotic gathering of Ukrainians, many of them devout Uniates.22 The Orthodox
celebration of Shevchenko in Lviv turned into an annual event 23 but Ukrainians in other towns also
defied Catholic and Uniate attempts to prevent services in honor of Shevchenko on account of his
anti-Catholicism and ordered requiem masses for “father Taras” pretending the poet was their
father.24 The struggle over commemoration of Shevchenko could be seen as an aspect of the broader
ritual purification movement that encouraged transconfessional contacts between Galicians and East
Ukrainians.25 Some advocates of purification went beyond cleansing Uniate Church of Latin
influences and travelled to Chełm in the Russian Empire to participate in conversions of Uniates to
Orthodoxy there.26 Other satisfied themselves with propagation of “Oriental” appearance in the
Uniate churches of Galicia by successfully promoting kolpaks among clergy and arguing for the
right to wear beards and venerate certain Orthodox saints.27 One Uniate priest, father Naumovych,
aided villagers of Hnylychky in their unsuccessful attempt at mass conversion to Orthodoxy in
1881.28
Support for the Eastern character of Church was expressed not only by religious dissenters
among clergy, but also those loyal to the Uniate Church. Hierarchy feared that too much Latin
influence would reduce the appeal of Eastern Rite Catholicism and thus limit the potential for
extension of union with Rome to the East.29 Thus, the significance of boundary between Orthodox
East Ukrainians and Uniate Galicia was repeatedly undermined in the religious life of Galicia.
Whether through conversions or support for the “Oriental” character of the Uniate Church, the
22
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Sereda, “From Church-Based to Cultural Nationalism,” 35-36.
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Himka, Religion and Nationality, 75.
Ibid., 116.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (OCTOBER 2016) XXXVI, 5

52

depth of religious breach between communities was called into question. This was partially made
possible by the very nature of the Uniate Church originally devised as an institution straddling the
divide between Orthodoxy and Catholicism. However, as Koliivschyna demonstrated, such an
outcome was by no means certain. It was the efforts of Uniate clergy and faithful that turned the
religious practice into a vehicle for promoting the idea of cultural and religious proximity with
Ukrainians in the East. Religion allowed this idea to reach people who otherwise had little access to
the emerging national literary culture developed among intellectual elites and thus complemented
other processes leading to the development of a national identity among Galician Ukrainians.
Religion's impact on relations between Galician Ukrainians and Poles was somewhat more
complicated. The difference in rite fostered group demarcation but formal unity of Catholic and
Uniate Churches also allowed for certain ambiguity and bridge-building across national divisions.
This could potentially weaken the Ukrainian national identity, which depended on a fixed and clear
boundary separating speakers of Ukrainian from other groups. The so-called Liberation Festival
celebrated by the Uniate Church in villages across Galicia in commemoration of the abolition of
serfdom was just one example of religious practice uniting different linguistic groups. The festival
was held annually sine 1849 and in the first decades many Polish Catholic peasants joined the
Uniate processions and celebrations to commemorate the event of crucial importance to the
peasantry, which was nevertheless not officially observed by the Polish Catholic Church. 30 Only in
the late 1890s the celebrations acquired a decisively national and increasingly secular character,
which resulted in the exclusion of Polish peasants from the celebration and transformed the date
into a Ukrainian national holiday.31 The two churches gradually accepted the nationalist rhetoric and
were increasingly perceived on national terms, so that continued participation of Polish peasants in
Uniate festivities was unlikely. This abandonment of universalistic principles and “nationalization”
of religious matters is best seen in the case of Andrei Sheptytsky's career in the Uniate Church.
Sheptytsky's nomination for bishop of Stanyslaviv in 1899 was initially opposed by Ukrainians and
30 Kai Struve, “Peasants and Patriotic Celebrations in Habsburg Galicia,” in Galicia: A Multicultured Land,. ed. Chris
Hann and Paul Robert Magocsi (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2005), 106-07.
31 Struve, “Peasants and Patriotic Celebrations,” 109.
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supported by Galicia's Poles for the same reasons. Sheptytsky was a Polish aristocrat, of Polish
culture, Latin rite and French mother tongue who converted to Eastern rite only upon entering
Basilian monastery, and whose career could appear to lead to Polish control over the Uniate
Church.32 Eventually the new bishop became extremely popular among Ukrainians and a
disappointment for the Poles. During his consecration, he reinvented himself as a descendant of
Ruthenian nobility, supported Ukrainian grievances and encouraged the clergy to take part in the
new national movement by establishing reading clubs in the villages.33 Sheptytsky's success and
reception depended on his adoption of Ruthenian identity and genuine conversion to Eastern rite.
This demonstrates that bridge-building between the Poles and Ukrainians was increasingly difficult
on purely religious grounds, and a dual religious and national identity was necessary for becoming
recognized as a member of a given group. Nevertheless, some mobility between those groups was
still possible, as demonstrated by Sheptytsky's case, and religious conversion was crucial for
allowing it. Furthermore, Chris Hann suggested that in some mixed communities around Przemyśl,
the ethnic and religious barriers remained fluid for much longer, as intermarriage and hybridization
of cultures continued well into the twentieth century.34
The impact of religion on the formation of Ukrainian identity in Galicia clearly cannot be
reduced to its role in group-building by inclusion of some and exclusion of others. Religion in
Galicia could help separate Ukrainians from Poles and connect them to Ukrainians in the Russian
Empire but it also had the potential to draw the Poles and Ukrainians together, while alienating
Uniates from the Orthodox East. It is possible, however, that religion fostered Ukrainian national
identity by carrying and propagating national culture, which nationalist movements build upon.
There is some evidence for that. The Greek-Catholic metropolitan of Lviv, Mykhailo Levyts'kyi,
was one of the first to propagate the idea of a Ruthenian language as distinct from Russian in the

32 Himka, Religion and Nationality, 129-30.
33 Ibid., 131.
34 Chris Hann, “The Limits of Galician Syncretism: Pluralism, Multiculturalism and Two Catholicisms” in Galicia: A
Multicultured Land ed. Chris Hann and Paul Robert Magocsi (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2005), 220.
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1820s and 1830s35 and such an idea was the first prerequisite for Ukrainian identity. The
participation of clergy was necessary for any early political movement as it was the only educated
group among Ruthenians. Only in the late 1860s the almost-exclusively clerical intelligentsia was
somewhat augmented by secular intellectuals of peasant origin who benefitted from Habsburg
education system.36 However, clergy's involvement continued, as young would-be priests were
influenced by Ukrainophile culture in seminaries.37 Some Greek-Catholic priests actively
participated in the national movement by organizing national populist reading clubs in villages, thus
attracting criticism from Catholic Poles and more conservative sections of Uniate clergy.38 The
participation of clergy in village reading clubs was in the end officially endorsed by bishop
Sheptytsky, as mentioned before, despite obvious danger of politicization of the Church. It could be
argued that the Greek-Catholic Church, its educated clergy and educational institutions such as
seminaries constituted a cultural and intellectual fundament upon which the Ukrainian national
identity could be built. This is hardly surprising, as in the context of the rural and illiterate
population virtually any political movement had to rely on the clergy. However, it is worth
remembering that clergy's national and political involvement did not necessarily meant endorsement
for the Ukrainian national idea as such.
One possible orientation that rejected Ukrainian identity in its modern sense was
Russophilism, and it could be seen as a competition to the Ukrainian national program. The Polish
administrators were willing to exaggerate the threat and influence of Russophilism, quoting both
emigration of Galician clergy to Chełm province and attempted conversion of Hnylychky in Galicia
as evidence.39 On the other hand, the trial of those responsible for Hnylychky affair revealed that at
least two influential Uniate priests, fathers Naumovych and Levytsky were harboring pro-Russian
and pro-Orthodox views.40 This seemed to confirm that Russophilism was a threat, as Naumovych

35 Magocsi, The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism, 89.
36 Ibid., 87.
37 Himka, Religion and Nationality, 145.
38 Ibid., 159-60.
39 Ibid., 87-8.
40 Ibid., 95-6.

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (OCTOBER 2016) XXXVI, 5

55

was not only the leader of Hnylychky's conversion but also one of the founders and leaders of a
prominent “Kachkovsky's Society” organizing thousands of Ruthenians since its establishment in
1874.41 However, the reactions to the Hnylychky trial, proved the Polish administrators wrong. The
loyal pro-Habsburg Ukrainian peasants responded by cancelling their dues to “Kachkovsky's
Society” and the new Greek-Catholic metropolitan in Lviv refused to tolerate pro-Russian leanings
of the clergy any longer.42 This, according to Himka, demonstrated that many followers of the
Russophile leaders were unaware of the exact content of the ideology, as the leadership concealed it
in fear of repercussions.43 However, it also shows that sections of the Greek-Orthodox clergy were
refusing to adopt the Ukrainian identity and preferred to see themselves as members of the greater
Russian nation, distinguished by merely “Little Russian” characteristics. This presented the state
with a threat and provoked repressions as early as 1874.44 It was perhaps the state repressions that
ultimately put Russophilists at a disadvantage and allowed Ukrainian identity to triumph both
among the Uniate clergy and the general population.
The third and oldest form of Ukrainian identity in Galicia, which in the second half of the
nineteenth century gave rise to both Ukrainian nationalism and Russophile tendencies, while also
surviving as a separate phenomenon until the First World War, was Old Ruthenianism.45 It was a
regional identity of Galician patriots whose loyalties did not go beyond the borders of the Austrian
Empire.46 It was also inspired by religion to a much greater extent than the Ukrainian national
identity of late nineteenth century, which had some secular characteristics. Emerging before 1848,
its initial leadership consisted almost entirely of Greek-Catholic clergy united by their opposition to
Poles.47 Perhaps the most important issue that eventually led both Ukrainophiles and Russophiles to
split from the Old Ruthenian orientation was language. While Ukrainophiles proposed standardizing
and codifying the Ruthenian vernacular and Russophiles encouraged the use of Russian, the Old
41
42
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Magosci, The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism, 135.
Ibid., 139.
Himka, Religion and Nationality, 139.
Ibid., 50.
Magosci The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism, 103.
Ibid., 105.
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Ruthenians advocated maintaining the Slaveno-Rusyn book language.48 This was a sign of
influence of religion and the clergy, as Slaveno-Rusyn shared many similarities with the liturgical
language of Old Church Slavonic, which was already employed by the Church and had a long
history.49 Slaveno-Rusyn could appeal to conservatively-minded clergy who viewed the emerging
Ukrainian language with suspicion, not only as a modern invention as such, but also as one
promoted by “free-thinking” and “anti-religious” national populists.50 However it also led to
problems, as Old Ruthenians had to effectively rely on two languages. Communication with
uneducated masses had to be conducted in vernacular, while serious matters were to be discussed in
uncodified Galician version of Church Slavonic, which carried historical prestige but was
incomprehensible to the general population.51 Gellner argued, that a sharp distinction between
vernacular and liturgical language is typical of premodern, agrarian societies, where “high” culture
is produced and consumed by a narrow literate strata, whose interests lie in maintaining barriers
between them and the illiterate masses.52 However, mass literacy is most easily achieved by the
introduction of a standardized and literary form of vernacular, rather than teaching the masses to
read and write in a dead language. Modernity in the Galician context meant the rise of mass
readership, introduction of standardized vernacular by Austrian school administration in 1893 and
the triumph of Ukrainian identity over the Old Ruthenian program. However, this does not render
Old Ruthenian identity irrelevant. Ukrainian national identity and Russophilism grew out of Old
Ruthenianism and build upon its earlier achievements, which in turn depended on clergy's
involvement. Furthermore, adopting Tara Zahra's idea of “national indifference”53 could suggest
that perseverance of Old Ruthenianism into the twentieth century was a form of resistance to
nationalism expressed in a separate identity built on religion and regionalism. Finally, participation
of the clergy in all three orientations of Galician Ruthenians shows that the religious structures of
48
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50
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the province did not favor any single identity, instead supporting various formulations of the answer
to the national question and influencing all of them.
In conclusion, religion's role in the rise of Ukrainian national identity in Galicia is rather
complex and cannot be reduced to a simple causal relationship. Ukrainian membership in the
Greek-Catholic Church allowed them to demarcate the boundary of the national group and
differentiate themselves from the Poles. Such an anti-Polish sentiment was based to a large extent
on religious difference and opposition the Catholic Church's influence demonstrated in the ritual
purification movement but non-religious factors, such as the Polish hegemony in the local
administration or class conflicts also played a role. This Polish-Ruthenian tension was manifested in
the earliest Ruthenian identity in Galicia, known as Old Ruthenianism, which later gave rise to a
more nationalist Ukrainian identity laying claims to statehood. However to claim that religious
divisions in Galicia produced national and political ones, would be an oversimplification. Religious
practice alone, as has been demonstrated, could occasionally bridge the divides between Galicia's
Poles and Ukrainians, and it was only after the religious life had been infused with nationalist
thinking that the religious difference led to increasing separation of communities. Simultaneously,
religious difference between Ukrainians in the East and those in Galicia could provide an obstacle
to identities reaching beyond Galicia's borders. Ultimately, religious practice in Galicia provided
plenty of opportunities to emphasise unity with East Ruthenians of Orthodox faith but less so with
Galicia's Catholic Poles. The flexible position of the Uniate Church between Orthodoxy and
Catholicism could in theory support the opposite outcome but as the culture became dominated by
the national populists and their Ukrainian national identity, stressing differences with Poles and
similarity with East Ruthenians became the most common view. However, while the Uniate clergy
played an important part in the development of the Ukrainian national movement and by the end of
nineteenth century endorsed it at its highest levels, the triumph of Ukrainian identity cannot be
attributed to clergy's participation alone. Due to the agrarian character of Ruthenian society, clergy

was bound to

play a leading role in any political movement and it did so by also supporting identities rival to the
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Ukrainian national one, such as Old Ruthenianism and Russophilism. Government repressions of
Russophilism and pressures of modernity on Old Ruthenianism were ultimately responsible for the
triumph of the Ukrainian national identity, both inside and outside of the Greek-Catholic Church.
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